We approach the virtual reality phenomenon by studying its relationship to set theory. This approach offers a characterization of virtual reality in set theoretic terms, and we investigate the case where this is done using the wellfoundedness property. Our hypothesis is that non-wellfounded sets (so-called hypersets) give rise to a different quality of virtual reality than do familiar wellfounded sets. To elaborate this hypothesis, we describe virtual reality through Sommerhoff's categories of first-and second-order self-awareness; both categories are introduced as necessary conditions for consciousness in terms of higher cognitive functions. We then propose a representation of first-and second-order self-awareness through sets, and assume that these sets, which we call events, originally form a collection of wellfounded sets. Strong virtual reality characterizes virtual reality environments which have the limited capacity to create only events associated with wellfounded sets. In contrast, the logically weaker and more general concept of weak virtual reality characterizes collections of virtual reality mediated events altogether forming an entirety larger than any collection of wellfounded sets. By giving reference to Aczel's hyperset theory we indicate that this definition is not empty because hypersets encompass wellfounded sets already. Moreover, we argue that weak virtual reality could be realized in human history through continued progress in computer technology. Finally, within a more general framework, we use Baltag's structural theory of sets (STS) to show that within this hyperset theory Sommerhoff's first-and second-order self-awareness as well as both concepts of virtual reality admit a consistent mathematical representation. To illustrate our ideas, several examples and heuristic arguments are discussed.
Introduction
Virtual reality has become a popular metaphor for a variety of aspects in contemporary media culture, including technological, scientific, philosophical, economic, and even religious aspects (Heim, 1993; Rheingold, 1991) . The technological aspect, however, is genuine because an attempt to create virtual reality is usually seen as the outcome of some directed engineering process. 1 Considerable progress has been made in this field, mainly driven by recent innovations in computer technology; computer hardware, software, and human-computer interfaces have become the leading advances behind this phenomenon (Rheingold, 1991; Sherman & Craig, 2002) , and within a relatively short time they have reached high enough standards to make virtual reality a popular technology. For example in the entertainment industry, where computer generated games have arrived at a level of sophistication regarding their visual, acoustic, and sometimes mechanical expression unthinkable only a few decades ago (Jones, 2005) . The growth of the Internet has lead to a new form of virtual reality devices, often referred to as electronic communities or virtual playgrounds (Linden Research Inc., 2006; There Inc., 2006) , in which many human operators can participate simultaneously in an interactive environment provided by computer networks (Evans, 2003) . Apart from entertainment and recreation, virtual reality technology has found applications in military technology (Peck, 1991; Sauer, Hollett, Keskel, Shelton, & Dillaplain, 1996) , in medicine (Westwood, Haluck, & Hoffman, 2005) , or in architectural design (Whyte, 2002) and engineering (Gray, 1993) .
Using adapted technology, virtual reality devices are designed to establish a certain kind of interaction with the human body, focusing especially on its external sensory and motoric apparatus (Rheingold, 1991) . To systematically describe this interaction, three essential quality indicators of virtual reality have been proposed (Fisher & Tazelaar, 1991; Heim, 1993; Steuer, 1992) : (a) Presence. Presence is the sense of physically being in an environment. It can be thought of as the experience of one's physical environment; it does not refer to one's surroundings as they exist in the physical world, but to the perception of those surroundings as mediated by both automatic and controlled mental processes. (b) Immersion (or, vividness). Immersion means the representational richness of a mediated environment as defined by formal features, that is, the way which an environment presents information to the senses. (c) Interactivity. This quality refers to the degree to which users of virtual reality medium can influence the form or the content of the mediated environment.
Every sophisticated virtual reality environment has to meet these quality indicators, hence we may surmise that the essence of virtual reality is closely related to each one of them. And even though virtual reality is often characterized as a phenomenon contained in computer technology, this relation reveals that it has to comply with our cognitive ability to consciously perceive both ourselves and the external world in which we are physically immersed.
Since technological progress in human history resembles an evolutionary process, we can ask what developmental stages virtual reality technology could reach. For instance, are there possible stages of convergence? Convergence would mean that at some (future) time any further progress of virtual reality technology would not lead to a significant improvement in its quality. At present times we might still be far from such a stage, but the rate at which new products in virtual reality relevant technology appear has increased after the introduction of computers. Still, from this perspective virtual reality technology may also be seen as a recent cultural achievement, and therefore relatively primitive, but we should recognize it as a technology with a potential to change human life and culture effectively (Heim, 1993; Lem, 1996; Rheingold, 1991) .
Starting from these preliminary considerations, our aim is to establish and to discuss a relationship between a distinct model of human consciousness and set theory in order to extend our understanding of virtual reality as a technological and cultural phenomenon. In particular, we want to show that virtual reality, consciousness, and so-called non-wellfounded set theory are intimately connected.
Non-wellfounded set theories naturally enlarge classical, i.e., wellfounded, set theories in that they introduce new structures, called hypersets (also referred to as non-wellfounded sets), which cannot be represented in a conventional set theory, e.g., in the common Zermelo-Fraenkel-Axiom of Choice (ZFC) set theory. In contrast to wellfounded sets, hypersets can be thought of collections containing an infinite hierarchy of membership. Specifically, we may depict a hyperset a by an infinite sequence of symbols fa 3 b 3 c 3 . . .g, or by a circular sequence fa 3 b 3 c 3 ag. In wellfounded set theories such structures are excluded by the Axiom of Foundation, which is one of the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms stating that the membership hierarchy must be finite. Thus hypersets use the membership relation 2 in a circular manner-a defining character that makes hypersets often well suited to analyze circular structures or situations.
To illustrate the difference between wellfounded and non-wellfounded objects we consider the example of bibliographical references in publications, such as scholarly articles. Normally, if a bibliographical reference is made in an article a 3 to a second publication a 2 , then it follows that a 2 was published before a 3 . In turn, the article a 2 could also refer to a third text, a 1 , this one published even before a 2 . This situation can be set up by a nested membership relation between three wellfounded sets: a 3 3 a 2 3 a 1 . However, through widespread communication over the Internet and document storage and retrieval on the World Wide Web this normal chronological order, i.e., the wellfoundedness of bibliographical references, could be distorted. Socalled Internet preprint servers nowadays allow authors to exchange manuscripts prior to editorial review and publication, so that a circular situation could form where article a 1 itself contains a bibliographical note pointing back to a 3 . As a consequence, a publication of all three texts would lead to a circular membership, a 3 3 a 2 3 a 1 3 a 3 , i.e., a non-wellfounded structure. 2 Hyperset theories have been formulated on firm mathematical foundations (Aczel, 1988; Bernays, 1954; Devlin, 1991) , and hypersets have been successfully applied in fields such as computer science, linguistics, and philosophy (Barwise & Moss, 1996) . But so far they have not yet been identified as indispensable structures in our capacity to consciously experience the physical world. However, precluding hypersets as elements of conscious experience including physical experience arbitrarily confines its meaning by ruling out contingent effects of virtual reality technology on cognitive experience. One of our goals is therefore to investigate the idea of non-wellfounded objects realized in virtual reality environments, and in this context we will argue that computer technology may indeed deliver such environments. Moreover, there are also formal reasons why hypersets may become useful for studying the interplay between human consciousness and virtual reality. As will be demonstrated in the last section of this work, two elementary qualities of consciousness can be represented in terms of modal logic, i.e., a non-classical logic that introduces modalities of propositions such as necessity and possibility. In turn, through the mathematical results of A. Baltag, modal logic can serve as the logical basis of a general set theory, referred to as the structural theory of sets (Baltag, 1999) , which naturally encompasses both sets and hypersets, thus generalizing classical set theories such as ZFC. In this approach, we address the consciousness problem by employing a model developed by Sommerhoff (1990) , in which the 'two elementary qualities' in question become first-and second-order self-awareness defined as internal representations of the subject (Sommerhoff, 1990; Sommerhoff & MacDorman, 1994) . This definition puts us in the position to draw a formal relationship between hyperset theory and consciousness.
With such a relationship at hand, physical reality itself is describable as a collection of internal representations, where every representation is mapped onto a set. This mapping lends itself to classify the elements of conscious experience, which we call events, depending on the presence or the absence of wellfoundedness. That is, an event may either be associated with a wellfounded set or with a non-wellfounded set (hyperset). To be meaningful, however, such a classification of conscious experience through sets should be plausible and non-arbitrary.
The premise is that conscious experience of the physical world during history before the development of virtual reality technology is adequately represented by wellfounded sets. This is understood as reference to times in human history when the cognitive picture of the physical world was not significantly influenced or altered by technical devices, since at those times technology itself had not grown enough to exert such an influence. Only quite recently virtual reality technology has began to realize its potential and to interact with the elements of conscious physical experience. Rheingold (1991) gives several historical references to identify the original beginning and the following growth of what he calls a symbiosis between virtual reality technology and human culture. He concludes that the development of virtual reality technology has been intertwined with the evolution of human culture for many thousand years, thus dating back to the very beginnings of human expression through arts, entertainment, or religion. This concatenation raises the possibility that virtual reality technology is immanently human (Heim, 1993; Rheingold, 1991) , in which case it would be difficult to identify any epoch when virtual reality technology was culturally nonexistent. We acknowledge this alternative and require that the interaction at those times in history should be small regarding any widespread implementation of virtual reality technology in human society. During the second half of the twentieth and throughout the beginning of the twenty-first century societal implementation of virtual reality technology has been driven by the advent of computers, and times before this recent development indicate an original status when events were exclusively associated with wellfounded sets.
This premise given, we are proposing that the interaction of conscious experience with virtual reality technology may happen in two distinct modes. In a first mode, which we call strong virtual reality, virtual reality devices may generate events that during technological evolution reach higher technical levels, and thus simulate with increasing quality events associated with the physical world. For example, contemporary technology offers two-dimensional visual displays or external acoustic devices for a simulation of original objects and situations. In strong virtual reality such technology may reach high standards, but it is limited to create events represented by wellfounded sets, and so it always shares-albeit in an abstract sense-a quality with events in the original physical world. Despite the recent progress, current state virtual reality technology can be characterized as strong virtual reality. However, continuing technological advance opens another possibility, where this characterization may change to a second mode-weak virtual reality.
In weak virtual reality, technical devices additionally create a new class of events, which are represented by non-wellfounded sets. Contrary to the original events associated with wellfounded sets, those events cease to have equal counterparts in the original physical world of the subject. Mathematically, this situation is expressed by the fact that the totality (that is the set-universe or, simply, the universe) of wellfounded sets is a proper subclass of the totality of all hypersets (called the hyperuniverse). This idea suggests that virtual reality may eventually confront us with an unprecedented quality of human experience, and our aims are to motivate, to define, and to critically discuss both modes of virtual reality.
This paper is organized as follows. In the first two sections ''Reality, virtual reality and consciousness'' and ''Events and strong virtual reality'', we prepare and then define strong virtual reality. As indicated, this concept employs a description of consciousness based on Sommerhoff's approach to the consciousness problem (Sommerhoff, 1990) . Strong virtual reality involves a set-theoretic description of what Sommerhoff calls first-and second-order self-awareness (Sommerhoff, 1990; Sommerhoff & MacDorman, 1994) . Strong virtual reality presumes that the structure of conscious physical experience, i.e., the structure of all events represented by first-order self-awareness, becomes a universe for Zermelo-Fraenkel-Axiom of Choice set theory. This implies that no strong virtual reality can generate an experience richer than the original physical world.
The next section ''Weak virtual reality and non-wellfounded set theory'' introduces weak virtual reality. It extends the first concept in that now the totality of events in virtual reality becomes larger than any collection of events in strong virtual reality. A conscious subject having an impression of weak virtual reality would therefore perceive the latter as a structure richer than her original reality associated with ZFC set theory. The remainder of this section is dedicated to the question whether this definition is meaningful. First, this question is discussed theoretically by giving reference to Aczel's construction of a non-wellfounded set theory. The latter, referred to as ZFC -+ AFA set theory, is realized through the Anti-Foundation-Axiom (AFA) which replaces the Axiom of Foundation in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. Aczel's relative consistency result then guarantees that there is a set-theoretical embedding of any universe for ZF (or for ZFC) within a larger universe for ZFC -+ AFA. Thus, with a construction of a universe for ZFC -+ AFA, we obtain a candidate for the totality of events in weak virtual reality. However, without further assumptions about first-and second-order self-awareness a conclusion on the meaningfulness of our definition cannot be drawn. We address this point in the forthcoming section ''Heuristic arguments'' but this time giving heuristic arguments why eventually the development of computer technology may lead to weak virtual reality, and by discussing an example motivated by the artistic work of M.C. Escher. Strong and weak virtual reality 205 In section ''Structural theory of sets as a general approach and concluding remarks'' we return to a theoretical consideration of the relationship between Sommerhoff's approach to consciousness and non-wellfounded set theory. We introduce basic ideas of Baltag's structural theory of sets (STS) (Baltag, 1999) , a general non-wellfounded set theory which includes Aczel's ZFC -+ AFA as a special case, and argue that STS is a proper mathematical tool for studying strong and weak virtual reality on the basis of Sommerhoff's ideas. This approach bridges cognitive and mathematical aspects, and so it conveys a more coherent picture of strong and weak virtual reality in terms of non-wellfounded set theory.
Reality, virtual reality and consciousness
Our immediate goal is to provide an abstract but, for our purposes, useful description of reality itself. We will use this description in order to formulate a concept of virtual reality that takes into account a consciousness model developed by Sommerhoff. We describe reality as a class R 0 , equipped with a variety of conscious subjects each denoted by a subclass of R 0 , and for now we presume that there is only one such conscious subject, S Ì R 0 . The environment of a conscious subject is its class complement which we call the world of S, and we denote it as W 0 = R 0 \S. By the self of a conscious subject we again mean the class S. We observe that the self and its environment are not introduced as separated entities that exist independently of each other, but rather as mutually determining and complementary classes of a unified reality: S does not exist without W 0 , and vice versa. We expect this mutual determinism to be essential for any proper understanding of the term 'conscious', which so far has been used only as an unspecified attribute of the subject S. This understanding should eventually allow us to point out a relationship between the faculty of consciousness, hyperset theory and virtual reality. But as there exists a vast variety of approaches to the consciousness problem, how can we choose one that would help to meet our goals?
To make a choice, we take a moderate position and look for a characterization of consciousness being semantically broad enough to encompass the three constitutive qualities of virtual reality, i.e., presence, immersion and interactivity with the world. We thus do not require such a characterization to provide us immediately with a relationship to sets or to hypersets. Instead, it should at least include the mutual determinism between the conscious subject and the surrounding world through these three qualities. Since all three require higher cognitive functions, it is unlikely to come with so-called 'bottom-up' approaches to consciousness. Typically, a bottomup approach initially focuses on the properties of individual brain cells, their reactions and interactions, their biochemical or biophysical properties, or their information processing capabilities. Higher cognitive functions are here expected to be detectable only after studying the concerted action of many brain cells, such as neurons. A bottom-up approach to consciousness usually does not identify higher cognitive functions in the first place, and it may even be questionable whether it can reach this goal without having a detailed definition of higher cognitive functions at hand (Hilgartner, 1993) . In a 'top-down' approach, on the other side, a prerequisite is the existence of certain higher cognitive functions necessary for conscious experience. Moreover, these functions are formulated as indispensable characteristics of consciousness seen as a whole system encompassing the subject as well as the subject's environment. After recognizing these characteristics, a top-down approach investigates the question of how they are realized in organisms that experience consciousness, and thus it prepares an exploration of the living correlates of conscious experience (Hilgartner, 1993) .
A notable top-down approach has been given by Sommerhoff in his book ''Life, Brain, and Consciousness' ' (1990) . His work's conceptual basis is the identification of a subject's internal representations, which he understands as the primary higher cognitive functions of consciousness (Hilgartner, 1993; Sommerhoff, 1990; Sommerhoff & MacDorman, 1994) . Our strategy is to use these representations for a definition of virtual reality which explicitly accounts for our cognitive ability to be, to perceive and to interact with and within the world. Hence, we adopt Sommerhoff's systemic description of consciousness (Sommerhoff, 1990, p. 90 ) by requiring the following two categories of representations, i.e., higher cognitive functions.
1. First-order self-awareness. A comprehensive and coherent internal representation of the world and the self-in-the-world. Representations of this kind we also call events. 2. Second-order self-awareness. Representations which represent the occurrence of a first-order self-awareness as being part of the current state of the self.
With the words of Sommerhoff, then, the faculty of consciousness is described as a power of a subject to form internal representations of category (1) and of category (2) (Sommerhoff, 1990, p. 91) . 3 We are going to give three comments on these categories. First, since this characterization of consciousness requires the faculty of a conscious subject S to generate some internal representations, it presupposes that S is equipped with an internal structure being able to constantly monitor the world and to register the occurrence of events. No further statements about the nature of such an internal structure responsible for this ability will be made in the remainder of this article; Sommerhoff addresses this issue with the quality of a subject being in a state of expectancy (Sommerhoff, 1990, p. 67) for an event, but for our present discussion, as we are going to show, this attribute is not immediately relevant. Second, representations of the first and second kind do not contain representations of merely possible objects, events, etc., as these are the elements of the subject's imagination. Sommerhoff argues that the latter category is certainly necessary for processes such as thought, but it is not a necessary condition for what we mean by being conscious about the world, the self-in-the-world, and about events. We adopt his opinion, and hence for our proposed definition of virtual reality we will exclude any direct reference to representations of objects of imagination. Third, for the introduction of virtual reality as given in this section it is not necessary to make further assumptions about second-order self-awareness. Hence we presume here the existence of representations that register the occurrence of events, i.e., second-order representations, without making this explicit in our definition of virtual reality. This situation will change in section ''Structural Theory of Sets as a general approach and concluding remarks'', when representations of the first and the second category will be expressed through the modal language of the structural theory of sets, a hyperset theory.
The two characteristics of the first category, comprehension and coherence, can be identified in terms of the two qualitative constituents of virtual reality, namely presence and interactivity. A comprehensive representation of the world and the self-in-the-world by a subject presupposes that this subject, who is a self at the same time, exhibits a sense of being in the world, but this is what presence means in the virtual reality context. On the other hand, interactivity in virtual reality requires for a conscious subject that the action and its response carried out between the subject and its environment as well as the action and the response carried out between the subject and the self-in-the-environment develop what we call a sense-making relationship; for example, this sense-making interdependency can be attributed to subjective locality, causality, and determinism. Here actio and reactio must form a coherent relationship within the internal representation of the subject. Otherwise coherence, and therefore interaction, would be lost if action and reaction become uncorrelated in the internal representation of the beholder. 4 The remaining quality of virtual reality, immersion, is implicitly present in the representation category (1), since this statement presupposes the existence of multi-sensory stimulus that sufficiently covers the sensory apparatus of the conscious subject in order to maintain presence and interactivity. Thus we have made plausible that our simple model of reality R 0 equipped with the subject S and the world W 0 may qualitatively be conceived a virtual reality. This is not surprising, for our own physical world, which can be seen as a realization of R 0 , meets all three qualitative constituents of virtual reality at a high level. These considerations motivate our first definition of virtual reality.
Definition 1.1 Let R 1 be a proper subclass of R 0 with R 1 \ S = S. Then {R 1 , S} is a virtual reality for a conscious subject S if S forms representations of category (1) and of category (2) when W 0 is replaced with W 1 = R 1 \S.
This definition implies that internal representations, realized as the subject's higher cognitive functions, incorporate the defining qualities of virtual reality. It is therefore a reformulation of virtual reality using Sommerhoff's consciousness model. Yet our definition still is preliminary because it fails to comprise the structure of conscious experience as a whole, and so it lacks immediate use for analyzing the structural richness of virtual reality.
Events and strong virtual reality
We give a more specific variant of the previous definition-one that determines the totality of subjective events in a virtual reality environment. To reach it, we first represent the basic elements of conscious experience as sets. Let S be a conscious subject, then a representation of the first category, which we refer to as an event E 0 , encodes two concurrent types of associations between elements of the world and the self-in-the-world. There is the association with a certain subclass P Ì W 0 of the world established through the internal representation of the world, and-through the omnipresent representation of the self-in-the-world-there is also the association of P with S. We represent both associations with one symbol E 0 (P,S), and further presume that an event E 0 (P,S) always forms a class for a given conscious subject S and a given class P in the world. Concurrently, secondorder self-awareness of an event E 0 (P,S), i.e., a representation of category (2), is given through the symbol E 0 * (P,S). Thus E 0 * (P,S) denotes a class and it encodes the occurrence of an event E 0 (P,S), referred to as a second-order event (Conversely, we may call events 'first-order events', but we will use the short form 'event' throughout this work.). To illustrate this situation, imagine the event E 0 (P,S) of consciously looking at a physical object, then the object becomes the class P here, the latter being a proper part of the subject's physical world, while E 0 * (P,S) represents the second-order event that registers the event of looking at the object P.
It is then natural to postulate that every conscious subject S has the ability to represent a whole collection of events, and we assign the symbol V 0 to this collection. Now we make the following assumption about the structure of V 0 .
Assumption 1 For a given reality R 0 and a conscious subject S the collection V 0 of all events is a universe for ZFC set theory.
By a universe for ZFC set theory we mean a collection V 0 of sets which is a model M of ZFC set theory, i.e., an mathematical realization of the axioms in ZFC set theory through actual sets. Assumption 1 is essential for our further considerations because it denotes the totality of the representations of the first category. This assumption also represents a reference to historical times in human history when virtual reality technology was still undeveloped, as explained in the ''Introduction'' section. But specifying the totality of events as a universe for ZFC set theory is still arbitrary at this stage because we have not explained why events correspond to wellfounded sets in ZFC. We address his problem and justify Assumption 1 in section ''Heuristic arguments'', but for now we use it only as a reference point in our classification of virtual reality.
Let domðV 0 Þ R 0 be the domain of the universe V 0 , that is the union of all classes PÌ R 0 that give rise to events E 0 (P,S). We choose a subclass of W 1 Ì dom(V 0 ) such that R 1 = W 1 [ S is a virtual reality in the sense of Definition 1.1, and thus we denote, in analogy to the collection V 0 , as V 1 the collection of all events E 1 (P,S) with P W 1 . Equipped with this notation we are ready to introduce the concept of strong virtual reality. This definition characterizes all those virtual realities whose collections of events are embedded in the universe V 0 for ZFC. Strong virtual reality is thus seen as a subset of the original world V 0 with the restriction that all its events are consistent with the subject's original universe V 0 , and therefore it would never convey a structurally richer experience than the original world. For example, we may think of recent technological advances where software controlled displays, headphones, data gloves, etc., are used to process the information flux through the sensory interface (Sherman & Craig, 2002) , and to conciliate presence, immersion, and interactivity in some imperfect simulations of the physical world. Hence, today's emerging virtual reality environments appear as an early form of strong virtual reality.
Weak virtual reality and non-wellfounded set theory
The following definition extends the collection of events in virtual reality.
Then {R 1 , * V 1 , S} is a weak virtual reality for a conscious subject S if {R 1 , S} is a virtual reality, and if V 0 Ì * V 1 for any universe V 0 for ZFC set theory.
In contrast to strong virtual reality, an established weak virtual reality would have dramatic consequences for a conscious subject because the totality of conscious events formed would be structurally richer than the subject's original universe, or, in logical terms: * V 1 would strongly imply V 0 . Thus in a certain sense the subject would experience a reality shift from V 0 to * V 1 . However, this interpretation is still preliminary because we have not explained how events are associated with non-wellfounded sets, and to what extent the mathematical difference between wellfounded and non-wellfounded sets corresponds to a difference in the subject's cognitive experience. Both problems will be addressed throughout the remainder of this work.
As a first step we want to examine whether this definition is mathematically meaningful. And, indeed, non-wellfounded set theory suggests that the concept of weak virtual reality is not meaningless because a universe for non-wellfounded set theory exists which already contains any universe for ZFC. We follow an intuitive approach to non-wellfounded set theory (Aczel, 1988; Devlin, 1991) , and introduce the so-called Anti-Foundation-Axiom (AFA), which replaces the Axiom of Foundation in ZFC set theory, i.e the axiom saying that the relation 2 is wellfounded. The resulting non-wellfounded set theory establishes a one-to-one correspondence between graphs (the pointed, directed graphs in fact) and sets via AFA.
Let G = {N, E} be a directed graph, where N is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges all being ordered pairs of nodes. For (x,y)2E we write x fi y; in that case x is a parent of y and y is a child of x. A path in G is a finite or infinite sequence of nodes, each of which (except the first) is a child of its predecessor. If there is a path from node x 1 to node x k , we say that x k is a descendant of x 1 . A directed graph is pointed if there is a unique node x 0 (the root of the graph) such that all other nodes are descendants of x 0 . In the following, we always mean a directed, pointed graph when we simply write 'graph'. The Anti-Foundation Axiom reads: Every graph depicts exactly one set (AFA). This axiom implies non-wellfounded sets, such as sets depicted with graphs having loops of edges, or with graphs with an infinite number of edges in a path-'sets' that cannot be constructed in ZFC. Replacing the Axiom of Foundation with the Anti-Foundation Axiom in ZFC leads to the set theory ZFC -+ AFA. One immediate question then is whether ZFC -+ AFA is relatively consistent with the original ZFC set theory, i.e., is there a model M of ZFC set theory that is a submodel of ZFC -+ AFA set theory? The next theorem gives a positive statement.
Theorem 1 [Aczel's relative consistency result] If V¢ is a universe for ZFC set theory, then there is a universe V * for ZFC -+ AFA such that V¢Ì V * .
The proof (Aczel, 1988; Devlin, 1991) is guided by two questions: ''When are two sets pictured by the same graph?'' and ''When do two graphs picture the same set?'', and we want to briefly sketch its main points. A system is a generalization of the concept of a graph in the sense that the collections of nodes and directed edges may now be proper classes also. Any system M satisfies the requirement that, for each node x, the collection ch M (x) = {x¢2x | x fi x¢} of all children is a set. Clearly, any graph is a system. A system map p:M fi M¢ between two systems M and M¢ is a map such that for all x 2M, p maps the children of x in M onto the children of p(x) in M¢; i.e., for all x 2M it is ch M 0 ðpðxÞÞ ¼ fpðyÞjy 2 ch M ðxÞg. As its main point, the proof of Theorem 1 provides a subjective system map p: V fi V c , where V is any system consistent with ZF set theory without the Axiom of Foundation (which we denote as ZF -), and where V c is a class which turns out to be a complete system. A complete system is a system M such that every graph has a unique M-decoration. Given a system M, an M-decoration of a graph G is a system map p d :G fi M. Since every complete system is a model of ZFC -, and every complete system is a model of AFA, it follows that the system map p establishes an embedding of V¢ in V * , which completes the proof.
Thus with regard to weak virtual reality, we have the following result.
Corollary 1 Let {R 1 , S, V 1 } be a strong virtual reality. Then there is a canonical system map p:V 1 fi * V 1 such that V 1 V 0 & Ã V 1 . Moreover, * V 1 is a universe for ZFC -+ AFA set theory.
Given a strong virtual reality, there is a larger universe for ZFC -+ AFA relatively consistent to V 1 , i.e., V 1 V 0 & Ã V 1 , which indeed suggests that Definition 3.1 is mathematically meaningful. Then, as already indicated, it remains to be shown that * V 1 itself is a collection of events such that * V 1 contains conscious events which are not elements of any strong virtual reality. However, this step cannot be done unless additional information is provided about the structure of the universes V 1 and * V 1 along with their members, i.e., their respective events. Such information concerns a suitable mathematical representation of the subject's internal state responsible for monitoring events, and an account how events may possibly change the internal state. The notion 'change' implies a temporal metaphor, and thus we may ask whether some process governs the subject's internal state and causes a transition from V 1 to * V 1 , i.e., a transition from strong into weak virtual reality.
Heuristic arguments
With strong virtual reality and weak virtual reality as formal entities, we present further evidence that both are relevant for studying the relationship between human Strong and weak virtual reality 211 cognition and virtual reality. We want to bring forward the idea that in weak virtual reality physical objects may be represented as non-wellfounded structures-something that controverts our everyday understanding of physical matter. We begin with a general outline of this idea and discuss an example thereafter. The physical world consists of material objects that find a scientifically valid description among physical theories and mathematical structures consistent with our physical experience. And physical experience itself is gained through scientific experiments and through our everyday life in the world of physical phenomena. In a common understanding, physical objects are spatially limited structures in a threedimensional geometrical space, i.e., in the physical space. Additionally, these objects are equipped with certain measures such as mass, charge or angular momentum. 5 Since this understanding implies that physical space is a topological space to which physical objects belong as sets, they must comply with an often unexpressed or even ignored condition: no physical object can be a proper part of itself. Clearly, this means that we cannot split an extended and material physical object into several parts, so that the latter become physical objects again, and then realize that one part is identical with the original object before the split. All physical objects are expected to follow this condition for otherwise contradictions would occur even at the elementary level of set theory. And from a certain standpoint this concern is justified because in wellfounded set theories any set a having a proper subset bÌ a such that :ða & bÞ with a = b must be disregarded, because any two sets a and b are equal if their members are equal (according to the Axiom of Extensionality) from which follows a = a, a contradiction to :ða & aÞ. Since set theory is seen as the basic mathematical theory describing the structure of collections, and so it can be utilized to represent any collection of physical objects, contradictions at this elementary level are to be avoided. 6 At the same time, however, a contradictory situation can be the source of a deeper understanding for it prompts us to scrutinize our basic assumptions.
Let us briefly recall the current role of wellfounded set theory in the physical sciences. During the history of modern physics set theory has largely been left unnoticed as a remote field in pure mathematics, and set theory itself has implicitly been equated with wellfounded (ZFC) set theory. Non-wellfounded set theories, although formulated rigorously as early as 1926 (Finsler, 1926) , have not received any continuous attention in the physical sciences. But such a restriction to wellfounded sets has placed the physical sciences in a certain situation or, differently put, within a certain context. Within such context, the above construct a cannot be a mathematical structure 'set', and therefore it cannot function as a scientifically valid model of a physical object either. Again, this tells us that in the chosen context of wellfounded set theories and notably on the background of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory no physical object can be a proper part of itself if we want to anticipate obvious contradictions. This observation brings out a reason why modern physical theories so far have limited themselves to mathematical structures like sets, groups, algebras, etc., that without exception are consistent with ZFC set theory. The reason is that non-wellfounded set theories have not been considered physical. Consequently, a universe V 0 for ZFC set theory containing wellfounded sets only appears to be a legitimate description for the entirety of first-order internal representations of the physical world in this context. Indeed, this argument recovers our statement given in Assumption 1. It thus characterizes the current situation in which all physical objects are expected to be wellfounded. But is this situation necessarily permanent?
To approach this question, we use an example given in Fig. 1 . It shows the famous lithograph of M.C. Escher titled ''Ascending and Descending''. As many of Escher's graphical works, it pictures a situation considered impossible in the physical world. In this picture a staircase is shown connecting four levels in a building. To follow the stairs represented in the scene, we may begin our way from the floor located at the left-hand-side of the picture-it is the corner with a two-story tower. From here a descent is possible, i.e., a way downstairs towards the ground. After making three Fig. 1 M. C. Escher's lithograph ''Ascending and Descending'' (1960) . The pictured staircase on top of the building is often characterized as 'impossible' because of its circular structure. In weak virtual reality such construction is conceivable as part of a subject's world. Copyright M.C. Escher Foundation Strong and weak virtual reality 213 more such descends, and after passing three more floors, something unfamiliar happens. Even though a way down has always been chosen, and so an arrival at a lower level somewhere beneath the starting point has been expected, the way has brought us back to the little tower-our starting point. But this must be impossible in physical space if the latter is understood as three-dimensional Euclidean space and if the embedded building is considered a rigid material object. We may illustrate this situation using wellfounded set theory. For this purpose we represent each of the four floors by members of the set {s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , s 3 }, and further assume that each member is a set s i = {s i-1 } with i 2 Z=4Z (i.e., i is an element of the cyclic group of order 4), so that the process of descending from, say, floor 's 1 = {s 0 }' to floor 's 0 ' is the membership relation between s 1 and s 0 , viz. s 1 3 s 0 . Hence, by making four consecutive descents we obtain the nested structure s 3 3 s 2 3 s 1 3 s 0 3 s 3 , which-in contradiction to our assumption-cannot represent a set s 3 in wellfounded set theory because it implies an infinite hierarchy of membership, i.e., a non-wellfounded structure. This example again shows that in general geometric self-reference and circularity as aspects of physical objects cannot be described within wellfounded set theory. From a mathematical point of view, events associated with non-wellfounded objects do not cause difficulties if we allow to shift our context from wellfounded to non-wellfounded set theory. For example, in ZFC -+ AFA set theory we can resolve the contradiction caused by introducing self-referential structures as sets. In the above case, the structure s 3 3 s 2 3 s 1 3 s 0 3 s 3 clearly depicts a non-wellfounded set in ZFC -+ AFA.
We see that despite the problems it causes in wellfounded set theory, Escher's picture gives a very clear impression of the represented scene, with high level of detail and with technical finesse-qualities that make it familiar and concrete despite its abstract strangeness. And from this standpoint we may go one step further and suggest an experiment, in which this special scene is presented to a human subject immersed in an virtual reality environment. The experiment would document the subject's response to this situation, and two distinct outcomes are conceivable. Either a negative result, i.e., the subject would not significantly develop presence, immersion and interactivity with the presented environment and would thus perceive the visual stimulus simply as a plain picture representing a fictitious scene (Fig. 1) . Or a positive result, upon which the subject would experience presence, immersion, and interactivity at a level where an internal representation of the staircase in Escher's ''Ascending and Descending'' would become an event associated with a physical object in the subject's world. 7 However, for such a level to be reached virtual reality technology would have to be fairly advanced, i.e., a certain technological standard would have to become available in order to conduct this hypothetical experiment. We think that computer technology may provide such standard, and first attempts exist that put 'impossible objects' into computer generated virtual reality environments. For example, in the project ''Escher revisited in VR valley'' (Dugour & Steenstra, 1998) several of Escher's graphical works have been transformed into animated computer graphics. Continuous spatial motion in three dimensions and sophisticated light effects have been added to the original scenes, and, in comparison to Escher's originals, the resulting virtual reality quality of the computer generated scenes has increased. Given this progress, we expect that technological evolution will continue to refine simulations of 'impossible' objects and scenes that include non-wellfounded structures. This advancement may eventually lead to a positive result of our suggested experiment, proving the subject's ability to conceive new and unprecedented events associated with a non-wellfounded sets in virtual reality. Evidently, such result would document a transition into weak virtual reality.
Structural theory of sets as a general approach and concluding remarks
In this work, we began our investigation of the relationship between consciousness, virtual reality, and hypersets by formulating the defining qualities of virtual reality in terms of Sommerhoff's first and second-order self-awareness. We have then taken further this formulation to define strong and weak virtual reality, and gave initial theoretical and heuristic arguments for why we think that weak virtual reality can be accessed through non-wellfounded objects in virtual reality environments. We now return to our initial point by showing that conversely non-wellfounded set theory can devise first and second-order self-awareness in pure logical terms. Moreover, strong and weak virtual reality admit a representation within a hyperset theory based on modal logic. This step indicates that consciousness, weak virtual reality, and hypersets can be put into one coherent theoretical framework.
Baltag has developed an axiomatic set theory, the structural theory of sets-STS (Baltag, 1999) , formulated in language of modal logic, i.e., a language generated by three logical rules (see Appendix): negation, conjunction, and unfolding. Modal logic is a generalization of classical binary logic: whereas the former introduces two propositional modalities, referred to as necessity and possibility, the latter does not make such a distinction and considers all valid propositions as logically necessary. In STS, the connection between modal logic and sets is established through so-called satisfaction axioms, which guarantee that under reasonable conditions a modal sentence is represented (satisfied) by a set. Hence modal sentences are seen as logical statements that can be satisfied by sets, and hypersets in particular are satisfied by sentences including infinite logical conjunctions.
One result of STS is the existence of a universal set U, which contains all sets satisfied by valid modal descriptions, and th(U), called the modal theory of U, denotes the collection of these descriptions. Since the universal set has members that are wellfounded and non-wellfound sets, we initially propose U for entirety of events of a conscious subject S, so that th(U) becomes the theory of U for the subject S, i.e., th S (U). As a consequence, STS offers here a direct connection to first-and secondorder events: Suppose E is a set in U, satisfied by a modal description / 2th S (U), and representing an event of first-order self-awareness. Then the unfolding rule says that there is another valid sentence, )/ 2th S (U), now capturing the information that U has a member described by /. In turn, the description )/ is satisfied by a set E * , yet another member of the universal set U, so that the set E * can be identified as a (second order) event associated with second-order self-awareness. This observation justifies our representation of events through sets as given in section ''Events and strong virtual reality'', and it can be summarized in the following proposition (a more detailed outline of our argument together with a brief introduction to STS is given in the Appendix).
Proposition 5.1 (a) Sommerhoff's terms of first-and second-order self-awareness can be represented in modal language. (b) First-and second-order events in strong and in weak virtual reality can be represented in STS as sets that satisfy consistent (infinitary) modal sentences in th S (U).
We have claimed that hyperset theory provides a framework for studying strong and weak virtual reality. This claim is now further supported by the above proposition which specifies a mathematical structure for the entirety of conscious events, including first-and second-order self-awareness, in one non-wellfounded set: the universal hyperset U in STS. Hence we propose that for any weak or strong virtual reality the collection of first-and second-order events is a subset of U.
Yet several unexplored directions remain, and one is the problem of identifying those modal descriptions which would result in coherent internal representations of the world and the self-in-the-world. As we have argued, only these peculiar events mediate presence, immersion and interactivity, and there is no reason to believe why all modal descriptions in th S (U) should lead to conscious events. We have mentioned in Definition 2.1 that locality, causality, and determinism may be such qualities.
Another direction regards the potential influence of virtual reality technology on the physical sciences. Since virtual reality devices may not only have the capacity to simulate the original physical world in strong virtual reality, but also to transcend it in the context of weak virtual reality, critical questions about the scientific character of physical experience in the light of virtual reality should follow. For example, is it imaginable that physical laws, i.e., the basic conditions of physical phenomena as currently known in science, will become largely arbitrary as virtual reality technology-a technology controlled by humans-develops further? It appears that we cannot answer such a provocative question with scientific scrutiny until we have explored further the conditions and implications of conscious experience.
Appendix
We employ a generalization of ZFC -+ AFA set theory and follow the original work of Baltag (1999) , in which a structural concept of sets is introduced, and we briefly outline some of the elementary ideas in STS. A structural understanding of sets is in a sense dual to the classical iterative (i.e., synthetic) concept of set. While in the latter sets are built from some previously given objects in successive stages (the iterative concept of set), the former presupposes that a priori a set is a unified totality that reveals its abstract membership structure only step by step through the process of structural unfolding. This stepwise discovery of the set structure is generated by imposing questions (which Baltag calls analytical experiments) to the initial object; the answers to these questions are the stages of structural unfolding. Thus at each stage we have a partial description of the object considered. The unfolding process can be defined by recursion on the ordinals: for every ordinal a and every set a, the unfolding of rank a is the set a a , given by a aþ1 ¼fb a : b 2 ag a k ¼ha a i a\k ; for limit ordinals; k Surely, this definition is meaningful for all wellfounded sets, but for a larger universe it is inappropriate in general since 2-recursion is equivalent to the Axiom of Foundation.
To arrive a definition of structural unfolding for more general objects, i.e., systems or classes, Baltag argues that at every ordinal stage we can only have a partial description of a system. Here, an essential concept is observational equivalence between systems-a generalization of the bisimulation concept for systems (Aczel, 1988; Devlin, 1991) . As a equivalalence relation, bisimulation is not applicable when large systems are considered, i.e., when those systems fail to be graphs because their collection of edges/nodes become proper classes. In such cases observational equivalence is given by modal equivalence, and not by the usual definition of bisimulation, and it turns out that with infinitary modal logic observational equivalence between systems can be defined to incorporate even large systems.
In STS, a modal theory th(a) for every set or class a is given through the so-called satisfaction axioms, and before we quote these axioms we may first introduce the underlying modal language.
1. Negation. Given a possible description / and an object a, we construct a new description :u, to capture the information that / does not describe a. 2. Conjunction. Given a set F of descriptions of the object a, we accumulate all descriptions in F by forming their conjunction V U. 3. Unfolding. Given a description / of some member (or members)of a set a, we unfold the set by constructing a description )/, which captures the information that a has some member described by /.
The language generated by these three rules is called infinitary modal logic, which allows infinite logical conjunctions. With W and h as the duals (obtained by substi-tuting^7 !_ and Å7 !Ã) to V and Å, respectively, we introduce the following operators:
ÅU ¼:fÅu : u 2 Ug;
ÃU ¼:fÃu : u 2 Ug; u^w ¼:^fu; wg; u _ w ¼: _ fu; wg;
4U ¼:^ÅU^Ã _ U:
The satisfaction axioms presume the existence of a class a Sat, each element of Sat is a pair of a set a and a modal sentence /. Writing a"/ for (a, /) 2Sat, these axioms read as (SA1) a :uifa 6 u (SA2) a ^Uifa u for all u 2 U (SA3) a Åuifa 0 u for some a 0 2 a with this setting the notion of unfolding of a set a admits now an expression through modal sentences / a a defined for any cardinal a as u aþ1 a ¼:Mfu a b : b 2 ag; u k a ¼:^fu b a : b\ag for limit cardinals; k:
Unfoldings of rank a are maximal from an informational point of view as they gather all the information that is available at stage a about a set and its members. In formal language this statement reads as the proposition: b "/ a a iff b a = a a . This explains the notion of observationally equivalent: two sets, classes or systems are said to be observationally equivalent if they satisfy the same infinitary modal sentences, i.e., if they are modally equivalent. In STS, the existence of sets is guaranteed by the bijection th(AE) between maximal weakly consistent theories and the sets (This correspondence is a direct consequence of the Super-Antifoundation Axiom in STS.). Weakly consistent theories are those theories in which all sub-collections of descriptions that are satisfied by a set are closed under infinitary conjunctions. It follows that non-wellfounded sets or classes are exactly those which do not admit satisfaction by any finite conjunction in infinitary modal logic.
On this background, we now make the observation that STS-constructed with infinitary modal logic-provides a tool for restating Sommerhoff's first-and secondorder self-awareness in set theoretic and logical terms. First, a universal set U exists in STS being observationally equivalent to the universal class U c = {x: x is a set}. We want to use U as the collection of all events E 1 in weak virtual reality. This is possible because any universe * V 1 for ZFC -+ AFA set theory is observationally equivalent to the set U (Baltag, 1999) . Thus a weak virtual reality {R 1 , U, S } can be defined within STS because any arbitrary event E 1 (P,S) 2U is associated with its modal description / 2th(U), i.e., E 1 (P,S) " /.
Any event E 1 (P,S)2U is then understood as the image of P W 1 under the map d: = th S s th -1 S , i.e., E 1 (P,S) = d(P) = th S -1 (th S (P)), with th S being the operator mapping classes P W 1 onto their modal theories and th -1 S is the inverse map; both maps exist in STS (Baltag, 1999) , and together they define the denotation function d: = th s th -1 with d: R 1 fi U. First-order self-awareness are mathematically represented by the denotation d, and second-order self-awareness is established through the unfolding rule, i.e., rule (3), as )/ now encodes the information that U has a member described by /. But ) / as a sentence is a member of th S (U), because th S (U) already contains the collection {) /: / is a consistent modal sentence} (Baltag, 1999) . Then th -1 S () /) must be a member of U, and we identify it as th -1 S () /) = E 1 * (P,S). This logical statement represents Sommerhoff's second-order self-awareness as introduced in Definition 2.1, because E 1 * (P,S) indeed satisfies the modal sentence stating that U has E 1 (P,S) as part of its current state. Finally, since rule (1) and rule (2) are satisfied, they recognize the fact that modal descriptions of events can be logically conjoined to create valid descriptions of events, Proposition 5.1 follows.
The special case of strong virtual reality is obtained by using a denotation d which maps classes in R 1 onto wellfounded sets. These sets altogether comprise the totality of events in strong virtual reality V 1 . In that case the corresponding theory is th S (V 1 )Ì th S (U).
